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26 APR 1975

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Jim:

Last June, I suggested to you that we should try a pilot study on the tactical/national intelligence interface to size the problem, develop procedures, and get some insight into possible payoffs. Our representatives then worked out terms of reference for a pilot study on national intelligence support to field commanders.

My representative, [redacted], USAF, IC Staff, has just given me the attached status report on the pilot study. It's a good summary of where the study stands now and what's yet to be done.

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I'm also sending information copies to Bill Clements, George Brown and Al Hall.

Sincerely,

JCS review completed.

/s/ Bill

W. E. Colby

Attachment:
As stated

cc: Honorable William P. Clements, Jr., DepSecDef
General George S. Brown, JCS
Dr. Albert C. Hall, ASD(1)

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IC/MPRRD: [] (16 Apr 75)

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REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
STATUS OF THE PILOT STUDY ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
TO FIELD COMMANDERS

Background

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☐ The President's memorandum of 5 November 1971 highlighted the DCI's responsibility for all intelligence programs, including "tactical" intelligence. With few exceptions, tactical intelligence assets fall outside the NFIP. They include the intelligence units and activities organic to or in support of the operating military forces, and also strategic warning systems, military department and theater intelligence staffs, and R&D projects.

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☐ Soon after getting the President's memorandum, Mr. Helms agreed that Dr. Hall should take the lead on non-NFIP Defense intelligence. In FY 1974, in the DCI's objectives for the Intelligence Community, we told the President that, jointly with DOD and the JCS, we would review military intelligence needs and look for ways that national assets could support the forces. The DCI continued this objective for FY 75.

JCS and Service Concerns

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☐ As intelligence buying power decreased, management interest in the relationship between NFIP and non-NFIP programs and activities increased. This interest focused on achieving savings by eliminating needless redundancy and by improving mutual support. The resource implications reinforce legitimate, strongly held JCS and Service fears.

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☐ They believe they can't be sure of national intelligence support in wartime because national needs will take priority over combat intelligence needs, many national systems are vulnerable, NFIP systems can't report fast enough for combat support, and communications may be inadequate. They are, therefore, very concerned about their force

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support intelligence assets. They believe that unless judged in context with the forces they support, these assets:

- ☐ Could be diverted from their primary missions to work on national intelligence tasks.
- ☐ Could be subject to centralized funding, taking from the Services responsibility for resource decisions for them.
- ☐ Could be traded for national systems incapable of supporting the forces in a timely and usable way, and unresponsive to the combat commanders in the field.

Memorandum of Agreement

☐ Against this background, in November 1973, you and Secretary Schlesinger appointed representatives who worked out an agreement for studying the tactical/national intelligence interface. This agreement called for the JCS to do six things:

- ☐ Determine with reasonable precision the tactical intelligence assets to be included in the study.
- ☐ Identify all tactical intelligence assets that contribute significantly to both national and tactical intelligence.
- ☐ Identify the peacetime, crisis and wartime requirements to which these assets respond.
- ☐ Compare these requirements with support available from national sources.
- ☐ Identify military force requirements that could be satisfied by national assets.
- ☐ Identify the contribution to the national intelligence effort that can be made by tactical intelligence assets.

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[] The IC Staff was to use the JCS report to develop recommendations to increase mutual support and eliminate duplication. The JCS, however, found these tasks controversial. The main problem was the degree of visibility to be given to force support intelligence assets. As an interim step, their report on non-CDIP assets that contribute to national intelligence was sent to you by Secretary Clements in May 1974.

The Pilot Study

[] As a follow-on, you proposed to Secretary Schlesinger, in June 1974, that the next step should be a study to develop specific recommendations for mutual intelligence support between the national level and the operating forces. You suggested starting with a pilot study to size the problem, develop procedures, and gain insight into the payoffs that are possible. By August 1974, we had approved terms of reference for this pilot study. This is our current effort and the focus of the report that follows.

Other Related Studies

[] You should bear in mind that this pilot study is only one of many linked to the tactical/national interface. So far, we have identified over 50 related studies, reviews and exercises, some completed and some in progress. For example, here are a few of the more interesting:

- [] An IRAC/IR&D Council study to identify R&D programs related to tactical SIGINT, and to recommend possibilities for inter-agency integration of effort.
- [] A NSC Staff examination of tactical applications for national reconnaissance assets.

[] We are building a working bibliography of these related efforts. It will be attached to the final pilot study report.

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Pilot Study Organization

25X1 ☐ The study group for the pilot study has a member from each of the military Services, DIA, NSA, NRO, CIA, US European Command, the Joint Staff and the IC Staff. It has observers from the Defense Investigative Service and DMA. Rear Admiral Robert P. Hilton, USN, Joint Staff, and I co-chair the study group. We each have executive officers appointed from our staffs to support us.

25X1 ☐ Two working groups, with members from the same organizations as the study group, work under the study group's direction and guidance. The National Working Group postulates national priorities and assesses the capabilities of NFIP assets to meet the intelligence needs of theater commanders in light of those priorities. The Theater Working Group looks for gaps in theater intelligence to be matched against national system capabilities. To do this, it defines theater intelligence needs and assesses the capability of theater forces to meet them. It also broadly assesses theater capabilities to meet national needs.

25X1 ☐ The study group will integrate the working group assessments and put together a final study report. That report will go to the Chairman, JCS, and to General Wilson for comment before we send it to you and the Secretary of Defense.


Study Scenario

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[] The study group agreed to use this plan. For the pilot study, however, it decided to limit the scenario to the last ten days of the defensive phase and the conventional offensive operations phase (C+25 to C+48). This will meet all of our study objectives. It permits assessment of a broad range of national intelligence assets against representative combat intelligence requirements. It forces consideration of competing intelligence priorities between the national and theater levels.

Intelligence Assets

[] Both working groups have drawn up lists of intelligence assets for this pilot study. For the National Working Group, this includes the assets in the NFIP, except those under wartime operational control of theater forces. It also includes selected non-NFIP assets, such as SR-71's. The Theater Working Group has a more difficult problem.

[] The Services questioned whether force support intelligence assets beyond those already in the NFIP, or listed in Secretary Clements' memorandum, should be made visible. Clearly, without this visibility we would have a distorted picture of the theater's capability to satisfy its own and national requirements.

[] The Service Operations Deputies discussed this problem in the JCS arena. They agreed that the Theater Working Group would develop its set of theater assets from the forces assigned in the contingency plan and from other forces the theater commander might identify for

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25X1 ☐ the pilot study. Intelligence capabilities below the Army brigade, Air Force wing and Navy task group levels will be considered in the aggregate. The Theater Working Group report won't identify specific assets below those levels. This decision should let us do the job. We will see how it works out as we progress.

Intelligence Needs

25X1 ☐ At first, we started to develop a full set of theater intelligence needs--essential elements of information, or EEI, for each level in the scenario from theater command on down. This would have resulted in thousands of EEI--too many to handle in this pilot study.

25X1 ☐ The study group decided to limit theater EEI to a vertical sample, cutting across all command levels. Working in Europe with officers from the theater and component commands, the working group chairmen developed 82 sample EEI. These EEI represent information needs of units from each of the Services. They can be played against each of the national and theater intelligence assets.

25X1 ☐ The pilot study also has to consider national information needs. They support assumptions about the availability of national intelligence assets for employment against theater EEI. The working groups also need them to broadly assess how well theater assets committed in the scenario can meet national requirements for the area of operations.

25X1 ☐ The study group found no statement of national level information needs for wartime. The KIQs, DCID 1/2 and JCS intelligence objectives and priorities all cut off at the period of tension leading to hostilities.

25X1 ☐ The National Working Group has the job of developing criteria and assumptions for national information needs and for determining the availability and capabilities of national assets. (National requirements for crises and wartime needs more discussion. It might be a good subject for the NSCIC Working Group.)

Pilot Study Status

25X1 ☐ Here's where we are now:

25X1 - ☐ The study and working groups are organized.

25X1 - ☐ A scenario that gets us down to the combat
25X1 intelligence level has been selected.

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- ☐ National intelligence assets are listed; theater assets are hopefully under control.

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- ☐ A good sample set of theater EEI has been developed.

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- ☐ A set of criteria and assumptions for national intelligence needs and for determining the availability and capabilities of national assets is close to completion.

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- ☐ Analysis has started where we have the data.

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- ☐ Briefly, here's what we still have to do:

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- ☐ Analyze theater capabilities to meet theater EEI and find the gaps.

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- ☐ Analyze national capabilities to meet theater EEI and fill the gaps.

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- ☐ Broadly analyze theater capabilities to meet assumed national information needs for the scenario area of operations.

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- ☐ Collate these analyses.

Study Methodology

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☐ The working groups will define criteria for assessing national and theater collection and reporting capabilities. They will use these criteria, and assumptions for the area of operations, availability, priorities, timeliness and weather, to estimate how well assets can satisfy needs. These estimates will be stated as confidence factors--high (60% or greater chance of meeting the need), moderate (40% to 59% chance), low (less than 40% chance), none and unknown.

Expected Study Results

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☐ Bearing in mind the limited purpose of this pilot study, here's what you can expect to get from it:

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- ☐ Insight into the scope and complexity of the tactical/national intelligence interface. This is a basic need for planning.

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- 25X1 - One methodology for analyzing interaction between tactical and national intelligence needs and capabilities. By comparing this to other methods, we can develop our approach to future studies.
- 25X1 - A model for looking at intelligence relationships between the theater and national levels. This should give insight into the areas where mutual support between NFIP and force support intelligence assets has the best payoff potential.
- 25X1 - Recommendations for possible improvements that can be made now.
- 25X1 - Recommendations for future studies.
- 25X1 - And, hopefully, intelligence support options that the JCS and our forces in Europe can crank into their current contingency planning.


Study Limitations

- 25X1 Limitations that the study group deliberately imposed on itself will condition the scope and depth of these study results. Briefly:
- 25X1 - The scenario is limited to the Mid-East.
- 25X1 - Theater forces are limited to units designated in the contingency plan.
- 25X1 - The operational environment is limited to conventional warfare.
- 25X1 - EEI for theater forces are limited to a representative sample.
- 25X1 - National information needs are limited to study group assumptions.
- 25X1 - The political situation is limited to actual conditions during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

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Completion Date

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
☐ The study group still holds to July 1975 for submitting the final study report to you and the Secretary of Defense. This date could slip to later in the summer.

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☐ I will keep you informed.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: *me* 21 APR 1975
Director of Central
Intelligence

SUBJECT: Status Report on the Pilot
Study on National Intelligence
Support to Field Commander

1. You asked whether, with some slight editing, it would be worthwhile to share the status report with the SecDef, DepSecDef, CJCS, and ASD(I). I think it would be.

2. I've reviewed the attached edited version of the report. It smooths over those candid passages that were written specifically to highlight problem areas for you. It shouldn't ruffle any feathers.

3. Working copies of the original report are in the Pentagon, one with [redacted] Joint Staff counterpart and another with the Theater Working Group chairman. They haven't been circulated.

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4. Recommend you sign the letter to the Secretary of Defense.

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[redacted]
Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Wilson

SUBJECT : Status Report on the
Pilot Study

Jan

1. The Director asked whether, with slight diplomatic editing, he should share the status report with the SecDef, DepSecDef, CJCS and ASD(I). I think he should and it does require editing. The original report was written for the Director and was deliberately candid.

2. An edited version of the report, a DCI letter to cover it, and a note from you to the Director are attached.

3. Please note that my counterpart, the Joint Staff study group co-chairman, and the DIA chairman of the Theater Working Group have working copies of the original report. They haven't been circulated.

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PD/DCI/IC

*P.S. After the Director signs
I intend to send copies
to Danny Graham & Lee.
Plummer*

ACTION

26 APR 1975

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